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NOTE 
HOW DO YOU SOLVE A PROBLEM LIKE 
LAW-DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY? 
WILLIAM SOWERS∗ 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Sometimes technology can threaten to upend an entire system of regulation. 
Autonomous vehicles challenge current driver-based regulations;1 3D printing 
defies patent law;2 the gig economy intensifies an ongoing fight in employment 
law.3 This sort of technology—what this Note terms law-disruptive technology4—
has three main characteristics. Law-disruptive technology is new or improved 
technology that brings significant societal or economic impacts and does not fit 
into existing legal structures.5 In these cases, the current statutory schemes do not 
provide answers on how the technology can or should be regulated. 
One vivid example of law-disruptive technology is the gig economy worker 
classification problem.6 Workers are traditionally defined either as employees or 
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 1. Self-Driving Vehicles Enacted Legislation, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES 
(Oct. 3, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/autonomous-vehicles-self-driving-vehicles-
enacted-legislation.aspx [https://perma.cc/X53Y-VVK7]  
 2. See, e.g., Timothy R. Holbrook & Lucas S. Osborn, Digital Patent Infringement in an Era of 3D 
Printing, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1319 (2015) (discussing the protections of current intellectual property 
laws on CAD files). 
 3. Michael L. Nadler, Independent Employees: A New Category of Workers for the Gig Economy, 
19 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 443, 458–59 (2018). 
 4. In researching for a paper on the gig economy, I realized that there was not an established 
classification for this sort of technology. Disruptive technology, while used broadly in media and popular 
writing, has a very specific meaning. See Clayton M. Christensen, Michael E. Raynor & Rory McDonald, 
What is Disruptive Innovation?, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2015, https://hbr.org/2015/12/what-is-disruptive-
innovation [https://perma.cc/RU8X-M534] (describing the expansion of the term disruptive innovation). 
Under the technical definition, disruptive technology involves a smaller company with few resources 
successfully challenging an incumbent by using “low-end or new-market footholds,” then moving up-
market and taking the incumbent company’s business while preserving their advantages. Id. This narrow 
definition does not encompass the sorts of companies and technologies many believe to be disruptive—
including Uber. Id. Thus, this Note proposes a new classification, “law-disruptive technology.” This 
classification disregards the process by which the technology disrupts, and instead focuses on the impacts 
of the disruption. 
 5. Infra, Part III. 
 6. The “gig economy” refers to the growing phenomenon of companies (or individuals) hiring a 
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as independent contractors, and courts use a variety of tests to sort workers into 
one of the two categories.7 Both classifications pose advantages and 
disadvantages for employees and employers. Employees are eligible for a variety 
of benefits and protections unavailable to independent contractors.8 But it is 
much more expensive for a company to hire an employee than an independent 
contractor.9 Alternatively, independent contractors are, as their name suggests, 
independent. Independent contractors decide who to work for—customarily 
more than one employer at a time—and can control their schedules and hours 
worked.10 Thus, companies have less control over independent contractors. 
While there has long been tension between the classification of employees 
and independent contractors,11 the rise of the gig economy brought renewed 
attention to these categories and led experts to question whether two categories 
are sufficient.12 Much has been written, both academically and in popular media, 
about how to classify workers in the gig economy:13 as employees, independent 
contractors, or some third yet-to-be-created category.14 
So how do we solve a law-disruptive technology problem like gig economy 
worker classification? We must first determine who should solve the problem. 
This Note advances the theory that, while courts may be the most obvious forum 
for resolving this dispute, they will not provide the best solution. An analysis of 
the comparative institutional competence of the three branches of federal 
government reveals that the legislative branch and the executive branch, through 
executive agencies, are better equipped than the judicial branch to address how 
 
worker to do one discrete task—a gig—on demand, rather than hiring a worker to do the task over and 
over. Elka Torpey & Andrew Hogan, Working in a Gig Economy, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS: 
CAREER OUTLOOK 1 (May, 2016), https://www.bls.gov/careeroutlook/2016/article/pdf/what-is-the-gig-
economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9R7-NQL8] These workers are often classified as independent 
contractors rather than employees. Id. 
 7. Muhl, What is an Employee? The Answer Depends on Federal Law, 125 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 
5 (2002). 
 8. Nadler, supra note 3, at 459. 
 9. Id.; see also Alana Semuels, What Happens When Gig-Economy Workers Become Employees, 
THE ATLANTIC, Sept. 14, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/09/gig-economy-
independent-contractors/570307/ [https://perma.cc/Q4U6-UK6N]  
 10. SETH D. HARRIS & ALAN B. KRUEGER, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, A PROPOSAL FOR 
MODERNIZING LABOR LAWS FOR TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY WORK: THE “INDEPENDENT WORKER” 
2 (Dec. 2015), http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing_labor_laws_for_twenty_first_ 
century_work_krueger_harris.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8CZ-6JM8]  
 11. Alan Hyde, Employment Law After the Death of Employment, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 99, 
101 (1998) (arguing that the employee/independent contractor dichotomy is unclear and that many 
workers do not fit into these two categories). 
 12. E.g., Miriam A. Cherry, Beyond Misclassification: The Digital Transformation of Work, 37 
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 577, 578 (2016). 
 13. See, e.g., Miriam A. Cherry & Antonio Aloisi, “Dependent Contractors” in the Gig Economy: A 
Comparative Approach, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 635 (2017); Omri Ben-Shahar, Are Uber Drivers Employees? 
The Answer Will Shape the Sharing Economy, FORBES, Nov. 15, 2017, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/omribenshahar/2017/11/15/are-uber-drivers-employees-the-answer-will-
shape-the-sharing-economy/#123f98535e55 [https://perma.cc/38WQ-YERG] 
 14. Cherry, supra note 13.  
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existing statutes interact with law-disruptive technology.15 One of the main 
reasons that legislatures and agencies are better suited to manage law-disruptive 
technology is that they can find new solutions, while courts must shoehorn law-
disruptive technology into existing categories. 
Shoehorning is different from analogical reasoning, which courts use every 
day.16 Using analogical reasoning, with each new fact pattern a court must 
determine whether to extend a test—or rule, or elements—to the facts at hand. 
H.L.A. Hart laid out a classic example of this sort of reasoning when he 
questioned whether bicycles are allowed in a park where “vehicles” are 
prohibited.17 
Shoehorning, in contrast, evokes the more negative implications of analogical 
reasoning.18 It conjures the image of being crammed—smashed into a container 
not appropriately sized.19 In shoehorning, new problems are forced into existing 
doctrines where they simply do not fit.  Law-disruptive technology, for instance, 
involves not just new applications of the law, but applications of the law to 
technology that did not exist at the time the legislation was enacted.20 In this sort 
of situation, the shoehorn is the wrong tool. Questions about how to fit law-
disruptive technology into the legal framework should be assigned to the political 
branches, which can change the existing categories or create new ones altogether. 
Part II of this Note defines law-disruptive technology and explores three 
examples: the gig economy worker classifications, 3D printing, and driverless 
cars. Part III of this Note explores the competencies of the judiciary, Congress, 
and federal agencies in statutory interpretation. Part IV analyzes the relative 
competence of the branches in dealing with law-disruptive technology using the 
gig economy worker classification problem as an example. Finally, Part V offers 
a brief conclusion and options for practical implementation. 
 
 15. While this Note refers to Congressional action as “interpretation” for consistency, interpretation 
is a misnomer. When Congress acts, even to fix previous misinterpretations by the coordinate branches, 
it is legislating, not interpreting. The executive and judiciary branches go on to interpret this new 
legislation. Although this note may slightly misuse “interpret”, it is intentional. This note considers law-
disruptive technology, that is, technology that may or may not fit into an existing statutory scheme. Thus, 
there is a question as to whether the new technology should fit into the existing legislation or the 
technology should receive its own legislation. In this sense Congress is “interpreting.” 
 16. See Emily Sherwin, Defense of Analogical Reasoning in Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179, 1179 
(1999) (“According to traditional understanding, judges engage in a special form of reasoning, the 
method of analogy.”). The use of analogical reasoning by judges is somewhat controversial. Id. Legal 
realists, among others, have criticized analogical reasoning as inherently and irredeemably inconsistent. 
Id. at 1183. 
 17. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 
 593, 607 (1958) (“A legal rule forbids you to take a vehicle into the public park. Plainly this forbids an 
automobile, but what about bicycles, roller skates, toy automobiles? What about airplanes? Are these, 
as we say, to be called “vehicles” for the purpose of the rule or not?”). 
 18. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr., 508 U.S. 602, 643 (1993) 
(“While Concrete Pipe tries to shoehorn its claim . . .”). 
 19. Shoehorn, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/shoehorn 
[https://perma.cc/3KZM-EX2V] (last visited Feb. 13, 2018).  
 20. For instance, what if a future court had to determine whether teleportation was banned under 
the vehicle prohibition?  
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Before jumping into the analysis, three final clarifications are in order. First, 
this Note focuses on statutory interpretation rather than constitutional 
interpretation or the development of common law. Similar questions of how to 
apply new technology to existing rules also arise in the constitutional context.21 
The rules of constitutional interpretation, however, involve additional 
complexities not considered here. Likewise, common law development is 
traditionally handled by the courts, and doesn’t present the same questions of 
institutional competence. Second, institutional competence literature has almost 
no empirical data available.22 Empirical answers to institutional competence 
questions, moreover, may be “unresolvable at acceptable cost within any 
reasonable time frame.”23 Thus, this Note, like most works discussing institutional 
competence, deals heavily in theory. Third, to limit the scope to a sizeable 
inquiry, this Note focuses on the competencies of federal institutions. 
II. 
LAW-DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
Courts should—based on institutional competency—defer to the political 
branches on statutory interpretation questions dealing with law-disruptive 
technology. This begs the question: what is law-disruptive technology? 
The proposed concept of law-disruptive technology has three distinct 
features. First, law-disruptive technology involves a new or improved technology. 
Second, it has the potential to make a significant economic or societal impact. 
Third, law-disruptive technology does not fit into the current legal framework. 
Technology often tests current legal rules.24 Courts should not necessarily 
yield to the other branches’ interpretations simply because a case involves some 
technology the court has not dealt with before. For instance, a new type of knee 
implant likely falls under the same statutory scheme regulating all current joint 
implants. Thus, new is not always disruptive. This proposed framework provides 
a basic formula for differentiating between new and disruptive. This section 
considers each of these features in turn by analyzing three of the most notable, 
current examples of law-disruptive technology: the gig economy, 3D printing, and 
self-driving cars. 
 
 21. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012) (considering whether a GPS tracker on 
a car established a search under the Fourth Amendment). 
 22. ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF 
LEGAL INTERPRETATION 153 (2006). 
 23. Id. at 158. 
 24. For instance, cities and municipalities had to come up with ways to manage the popular 
hoverboards. Michael Cabantuan, State’s Hoverboard Access Law Lands Just in Time, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 
27, 2015, https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Sate-s-hoverboard-access-law-lands-just-in-time-
6722893.php [https://perma.cc/5EQ5-3GRB]  
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A. New or Improved Technology 
Law-disruptive technology is a new technology. But law-disruptive 
technology does not have to be entirely new. In technology, “a difference in 
degree can become a difference in kind.”25 For example, gig economy companies 
are not the first companies to play with the employee v. independent contractor 
line.26 But, unlike existing industries, the entire gig economy is made up of 
“crowdwork”—it “rel[ies] on technology to deploy workers to perform tasks . . . 
for requesters in the real world paying for those services.”27 The foundation of 
the gig economy is its ability to match people doing tasks with those in need of 
help just-in-time. Requiring gig economy companies to classify workers as 
employees might destroy the very competitive advantage of gig economy 
companies by reducing their ability to provide just-in-time labor.28 The gig 
economy is therefore new in that, unlike previous companies that attempted to 
skirt the employee/contractor line, here the entire industry is built on just-in-time 
workers. 
Moreover, because the gig economy is new, it is unclear how different legal 
and policy choices will impact law-disruptive technology. Forcing law-disruptive 
technology into a current statutory scheme could possibly shut down the new 
technology altogether.29 It might alter or destroy the trait that led people to adopt 
the law-disruptive technology in the first place. The gig economy has thrived, at 
least in part, because people want flexibility.30 However, classifying gig economy 
 
 25. Neal K. Katyal, Disruptive Technologies and the Law, 102 GEO. L.J. 1685, 1687 (2014). 
 26. E.g., Craig v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 792 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 2015) (considering whether 
FedEx workers qualify as employees); see also Hyde, supra note 11 (arguing that the 
employee/independent contractor dichotomy was unclear long before the gig economy, and that many 
workers do not fit into these two categories). 
 27. Cherry & Aloisi, supra note 13, at 641. 
 28. Not all gig economy companies classify their workers as independent contractors. And some 
companies that classify workers as independent contractors nonetheless offer benefits, such as health 
insurance, traditionally only offered to employees. Antonio Aloisi, Commoditized Workers: Case Study 
Research on Labor Law Issues Arising from a Set of “On-Demand/Gig Economy” Platforms, 37 COMP. 
LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 653, 684–85 (2016) (noting that Taskrabbit offers its independent contractors 
discounted health insurance, and Hello Alfred, Luxe, and Shyp decided to classify their workers as 
employees).  
 29. See, e.g., Dara Kerr & Richard Nieva, On-Demand Cleaning Startup Homejoy Shuts Up Shop, 
CNET (July 17, 2015) https://www.cnet.com/news/on-demand-cleaning-startup-homejoy-shuts-up-shop/ 
[https://perma.cc/T63Z-PJ3A] (explaining that gig economy company Homejoy, which specialized in on-
demand home cleaning, shut down in part because the company was sued for allegedly illegally 
misclassifying its workers as independent contractors rather than employees). 
 30. ARUN SUNDARARAJAN, THE SHARING ECONOMY: THE END OF EMPLOYMENT AND THE RISE 
OF CROWD-BASED CAPITALISM 159 (2016) (“The Uber driver population also seems to not see full-time 
employment as the Holy Grail. In a survey conducted in June 2015 by SherpaShare, a provider 
of financial services to sharing economy providers, two out of three Uber drivers indicated that they 
viewed themselves as independent contractors to the platform rather than as employees.”); V. B. Dubal, 
Winning the Battle, Losing the War?: Assessing the Impact of Misclassification Litigation on Workers in 
the Gig Economy, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 739, 796–97 (finding that in early gig misclassification cases, 
litigation was not ultimately successful because workers did not want full employee classification, they 
only wanted particular rights); ERNST & YOUNG, GLOBAL GENERATIONS: A GLOBAL STUDY ON 
WORK-LIFE CHALLENGES ACROSS GENERATIONS 12 (2015), https://www.ey.com/Publication/ 
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workers as employees would likely lead to a decrease in flexibility, because gig 
economy companies would have the right to schedule employees’ work hours and 
to require a set number of hours worked per week. Thus, an interpretation of 
statutes dealing with gig economy worker classification that classifies all workers 
as employees could change the entire industry.31 
B. Significant Economic or Societal Impact 
In addition to being new or improved, law-disruptive technology must have a 
significant impact on the economy or society. There is, of course, no specific 
measurement of “significant impact.” But we can glean some clues from the 
examples of law-disruptive technology. 
For instance, the gig economy may employ as much as ten percent of the 
workforce, although these numbers are disputed.32 The user numbers, however, 
are less disputed.33 As of January 2016, over 90 million U.S. adults had 
participated in a gig economy transaction.34 Thus, at least on the user end, the 
impact of the gig economy is significant. 
Likewise, while the impacts are not yet realized, 3D printing has experienced 
“rapid uptake at different layers of society.”35 3D printing has the ability to 
impact all three levels of manufacturing: the home, the start-up, and the assembly 
line.36 Some experts estimate 3D printing may have as much as a $600 billion 
impact on the U.S. economy.37 3D printing is already having a major economic 
impact. For example, by 2018, experts predicted that 3D printing could result in 
as much as $100 billion in losses as a result of intellectual property theft.38 
 
vwLUAssets/EY-global-generations-a-global-study-on-work-life-challenges-across-generations/$FILE/ 
EY-global-generations-a-global-study-on-work-life-challenges-across-generations.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CQ2D-HVNF] (noting that two of the five top reasons for leaving full-time 
employment are to work fewer hours, and to increase flexibility). 
 31. Moreover, statutory interpretation in the worker classification realm can have huge collateral 
consequences. Worker classification impacts the traditional employment statutes protecting at-work 
rights such as the right to unionize, National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012); freedom 
from workplace discrimination, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012); and 
the right to overtime, The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2012). However, employment 
classification impacts other areas that are not necessarily considered “employment” rights, such as tax 
liability. E.g. Federal Insurance Contribution Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101 3128. Any institution interpreting 
the meaning of employee under federal statute must keep these collateral consequences in mind. 
 32. Ben Casselman, Maybe the Gig Economy Isn’t Reshaping Work After All, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 
2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/07/business/economy/work-gig-economy.html [https://perma.cc/ 
98Y7-U2P2]. 
 33. Katy Steinmetz, Exclusive: See How Big the Gig Economy Really Is, TIME, Jan. 6, 2016, 
http://time.com/4169532/sharing-economy-poll/ [https://perma.cc/RXD6-J99Y]. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Deven R. Desai & Gerard N. Magliocca, Patents, Meet Napster: 3D Printing and the Digitization 
of Things, 102 GEO. L.J. 1691, 1694 (2014). 
 36. Id. at 1698. 
 37. Sean Monahan & Tim Simpson, 3-D Printing’s Economic Benefits Are Too Big to Ignore, THE 
HILL, Nov. 9, 2017, https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/359672-3-d-printings-economic-benefits-are-
too-big-to-ignore [https://perma.cc/ZE84-DFT9].  
 38. Gartner Says Uses of 3D Printing Will Ignite Major Debate on Ethics and Regulation, 
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Driverless cars, too, have the potential to change society and the economy. 
Car crashes currently kill over 30,000 people per year and cost over two percent 
of the U.S. GDP.39 Researchers indicate that driverless technology could reduce 
crashes to one percent of the current rate.40 
As these examples illustrate, law-disruptive technology is limited to major 
technological innovations or improvements that can significantly impact the 
economy or society. As the societal or economic impact decreases, the line 
becomes fuzzier between what is merely a new technology and what is a law-
disruptive technology. But reasoned judgment, along with consideration of the 
other element of law-disruptive technology, should allow for sorting. 
C. Law-Disruptive Technology Does Not Fit into Existing Legal Structures 
The final element of law-disruptive technology is that it does not neatly fit 
into existing legal paradigms, particularly existing statutes. The question is not 
whether the statute was written in a way that left some ambiguity—for instance, 
whether bicycles are vehicles and thus prohibited from the park.41 Rather, the 
question is whether the technology that was clearly not considered at the time of 
enactment, because it did not yet exist, should be forced into the existing 
statutory structure. 
For example, the gig economy worker classification problem does not fit 
neatly into the employee v. independent contractor dichotomy. As an initial 
problem, there is not a clear definition for employees or independent contractors. 
Often the test for determining worker classification depends on which federal law 
is being applied.42 Moreover, gig economy workers appear to share characteristics 
of both employees and independent contractors: courts have had a difficult time 
determining whether gig economy workers are employees or independent 
contractors.43 
 
GARTNER.COM (Jan. 29, 2014). 
 39. Katyal, supra note 25, at 1688. 
 40. Id. This does not even take into account the time and fuel savings that might result from more 
efficient driving. Some estimate this could save 2,272 hours of travel time and 724 million gallons of gas 
a year. Id. at 1689. For a fascinating look at the possible advantages and barriers to implementation of 
driverless cars, see DANIEL J. FAGNANT & KARA M. KOCKELMAN, ENO CTR. FOR TRANSP., 
PREPARING A NATION FOR AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES: OPPORTUNITIES, BARRIERS AND POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS (2013), available at https://www.enotrans.org/etl-material/preparing-a-nation-for-
autonomous-vehicles-opportunities-barriers-and-policy-recommendations/ [https://perma.cc/MJ3E-
GQF9].  
 41. Supra Part I, at 4. 
 42. Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One and How It 
Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 299 (2001). The Fair Labor Standards Act, 
for instance, defines an employee as “any individual employed by an employer.” 29 U.S.C. § 203. To 
make sense of such circular definitions, courts have developed three different tests to determine whether 
a worker counts as an employee. Muhl, supra note 7, at 6. Each test applies to a different set of federal 
laws. Id.  
 43. See, e.g., Lawson v. Grubhub, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 3d 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (finding that five of 
nine factors cut in favor of classifying the worker as an independent contractor). 
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So too, 3D printing lingers around the edges of the current statutory 
framework. For instance, 3D printing threatens one of the barriers to patent 
infringement—the barrier of production.44 Patent law is founded, in part, on the 
idea that it is difficult to reproduce someone’s product and thus infringe on their 
patent.45 3D printing removes this protection by making it easy to reproduce a 
product at home. Thus, it is uncertain what protections patent law provides. In 
this way, 3D printing mirrors an earlier law-disruptive technology, the 
digitization of music, which required new legislation to save an entire industry.46 
Self-driving cars may provide the clearest example of technology that evades 
classification and regulation under existing statutory schemes.47 States currently 
have “no legal framework” for determining liability in a driverless-car accident.48 
Moreover, some state statutes currently provide criminal liability for drivers who 
violate traffic laws.49 It is unclear if criminal liability could or should attach to the 
“driver” of an automated vehicle. 
Driver age restrictions provide another example of how driverless cars defy 
current statutory regimes. Utah’s age requirement, for instance, reads, “A person 
under 16 years of age, whether resident or nonresident of this state, may not 
operate a motor vehicle upon any highway of this state.”50 Yet one of the biggest 
advantages of autonomous vehicles is that they do not need any driver, much less 
one over the age of sixteen. 
* * * 
Law-disruptive technology is different from mere innovation.  As these three 
proposed forms of law-disruptive technology—the gig economy, 3D printing, and 
driverless cars—illustrate, law-disruptive technology involves not only new or 
improved technology. It must have the potential to make a significant economic 
or societal impact. And it does not fit into the current legal framework. 
 
 44. Desai & Magliocca, supra note 35, at 1704. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 1703–04. 
 47. Cars are, at least in terms of driving rules as opposed to safety or environmental manufacturing 
rules, mostly regulated at the state level. Thus, they fall outside of this Note’s scope for purposes of 
evaluating the institutional competence of the branches of the Federal Government to decide statutory 
interpretation questions in cases of law-disruptive technology. These state driver and vehicle safety laws 
are still instructive as an example of how law-disruptive technology evades definition or regulation under 
existing statutes. 
 48. Katyal, supra note 25, at 1689. 
 49. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-862 (2018) (“A person shall be guilty of reckless driving who drives a 
motor vehicle on the highways in the Commonwealth (i) at a speed of twenty miles per hour or more in 
excess of the applicable maximum speed limit or (ii) in excess of eighty miles per hour regardless of the 
applicable maximum speed limit.”). 
 50. UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-8-1 (2018). 
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III. 
INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE 
The judiciary is not the only branch of the government tasked with statutory 
interpretation.51 The executive branch is charged with interpreting statutes; the 
President must determine how to faithfully execute the law.52 Congress, too, 
“interprets” statutes—for example by passing new legislation to overturn judicial 
precedent that did not align with Congressional intent.53 
All interpretation is not created equal. Each branch has intrinsic strengths 
and weaknesses—institutional competencies—that impact the effectiveness of 
that branch’s interpretations.54 Thus, when considering the mode of statutory 
interpretation to use, two scholars noted: “[t]he central question is not how, in 
principle, should a text be interpreted? The question instead is how should 
certain institutions, with their distinctive abilities and limitations, interpret 
certain texts?”55 And the process of institutional choice—deciding who should 
decide—is not a mere academic exercise. Choosing who decides may ultimately 
impact which rights are recognized.56 
Moreover, the process of choosing the most competent institution to 
undertake a particular task is comparative.57 The relative strengths and 
weaknesses of each institution must be weighed.58 The best option must be chosen 
from among “highly imperfect alternatives.”59 Thus, even the institution best 
suited for a task might not be good at that task.60 
Another difficulty of comparative institutional analysis is that there must be 
a benchmark to determine what makes one institution’s process better than the 
 
 51. Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L.REV. 
1189, 1190 (2006). 
 52. Id. at 1191; Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986) (“Interpreting a law enacted by Congress 
to implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of ‘execution’ of the law.”). 
 53. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 
YALE L.J. 331, 424 (1991) (outlining Congressional action overturning judicial decisions in appendix I); 
e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 101-544, at 12 (1990) (“The Committee has determined that the Supreme Court 
misinterpreted Congressional intent.”); S. REP. No. 101-263, at 1510 (1990) (“The Supreme Court 
incorrectly held that the ADEA permitted arbitrary age discrimination in employee benefit plans. The 
bill is necessary to correct that erroneous holding.”); S. REP. NO. 100-64, at 1 (1987) (“S. 557 was 
introduced on February 19, 1987, to overturn the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Grove City College 
v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 and to restore the effectiveness and vitality of the four major civil rights statutes that 
prohibit discrimination in federally assisted programs.”).  
 54. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L.REV. 885, 886 
(2003).  
 55. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 56. Lawrence M. Solan, Statutory Inflation and Institutional Choice, 44 WM. & MARY L.REV. 2209, 
2282–83 (2003). 
 57. Ernest A Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and 
Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1818 (2005). 
 58. Id. 
 59. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 5 (1994). 
 60. Id. at 6. 
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others, rather than just different. “[I]nstitutional choice cannot be assessed 
except against the [benchmark] of some social goal or set of goals.”61 Of course, 
scholars are split on what the goal should be.62 The law-and-economics wing, for 
instance, sees resource allocation efficiency as the ultimate goal.63 In contrast, 
Constitutional law is often evaluated in terms of social goals.64 These goals are 
usually tied to a particular set of public policies.65 Thus, merely determining the 
goals of institutional choice may have an impact on the outcome of the underlying 
inquiry.66 Here, determining the goals in regulating law-disruptive technology 
may have an almost-dispositive effect.67 
So what should the goals be when considering law-disruptive technology? 
First, the ideal institution for considering law-disruptive technology should be 
democratically accountable. Law-disruptive technology is new. Law-disruptive 
technology does not fit into existing statutory schemes. Thus, by definition, a 
democratically accountable institution has not yet considered how to regulate the 
law-disruptive technology. Moreover, law-disruptive technology has the 
potential to impact the economy and society on an enormous scale. Accordingly, 
society should have a say in the outcome. The institution best suited for statutory 
interpretation in the realm of law-disruptive technology is, therefore, one that is 
aware of and responsive to the will of the people. 
A second goal for interpretation is to align statutory interpretation with the 
purposes of a system of legal rules.68 Thus, the laws governing law-disruptive 
technology should, ideally, be predictable and effective.69 But law-disruptive 
technology is by its very nature unpredictable.70 The branch of government best 
suited for statutory interpretation related to law-disruptive technology should be 
able to create comprehensive rules that impose structure. And it should be able 
to do so quickly. Law-disruptive technology has the ability to change society. 
People, government, and businesses need to understand how to deal with these 
new technologies as they arise. 
 
 61. Id. at 5. 
 62. Id. at 4 (discussing possible goal alternatives). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. For instance, if a goal of law-disruptive technology is to allow the public to have a say in how the 
technology should be regulated, the job of interpreting statutes related to law-disruptive technology 
likely should not fall to the courts.  
 68. William N. Eskridge Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of 
the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret Statutes, 2013 WIS. L.REV. 411, 414. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Jennifer Pinsof, A New Take on an Old Problem: Employee Misclassification in the Modern Gig-
Economy, 22 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.REV. 341, 353 (2016) (noting that in addition to individual 
consequences for employers, governments may also face a sizeable reduction in payroll taxes due to the 
increasing number of gig economy employees classified as independent contractors). 
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Based on these goals,71 a comparison of the institutional competencies of 
federal courts, Congress, and federal agencies reveals that statutory 
interpretation questions involving law-disruptive technology are best left to the 
legislature or agencies. Courts should defer, where possible, to the more 
competent political branches in these situations. 
A. The Judiciary 
Often the judiciary is tasked with testing how new technology fits into current 
legal structures. But, based on an analysis of the institutional structure of the 
judiciary, it is not clear that it is the best institution to handle law-disruptive 
technology. The federal judiciary is marked by four distinct characteristics. First, 
judges are highly educated and generally trained to undertake rigorous statutory 
interpretation. Second, the federal judiciary is relatively difficult to access. Third, 
courts are constrained in their fact-gathering abilities. Fourth, judges are 
independent and not politically accountable. 
The judiciary has institutional strengths that lend it to statutory 
interpretation. Judges are uniquely situated to perform an exacting textual 
analysis of laws and regulations.72 Federal judges are, usually, highly intelligent 
and well-educated.73 Moreover, they are trained to exercise detached judgment.74 
And most federal judges are generalists.75 The general nature of federal judges’ 
dockets allows for “cross-fertilization.”76 Courts can apply lessons learned from 
one statute to new statutes. Thus, not only are judges well-trained for textual 
statutory analysis, judges are also able to see Congress’s work across a variety of 
statutes and fields. 
However, this specified competence might cut the other way depending on 
one’s judicial philosophy. For those who advocate for courts to undertake a 
purposive or evolving analysis rather than a textualist interpretation,77 a 
specialization in deep textual analysis might lead courts to “miss the right 
purpose-based analysis.”78 In the labor and employment realm, for instance, 
those who believe the Fair Labor Standards Act should be used to extend 
overtime protections to as many workers as possible might not want the judges 
 
 71. These goals are—admittedly—somewhat arbitrary. Reasonable people could, and likely should, 
propose other goals based on different policy decisions. But the comparative process must start 
somewhere, and these will work as a baseline. 
 72. Eskridge, supra note 68. See also, ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: 
THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (discussing the importance of rigorous textual analysis). 
 73. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 257 (1999). 
 74. Id.  
 75. Diane P. Wood, Generalist Judges in a Specialized World, 50 SMU L. REV. 1755, 1756 (1997). 
But see Jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012) 
(authorizing exclusive but narrow jurisdiction for the Federal Circuit). 
 76. Wood, supra note 75, at 1767. 
 77. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 136 U.PA. L.REV. 1479 
(1987) (arguing that courts should conduct statutory interpretation considering not the original intent, 
but rather the current need). 
 78. Eskridge, supra note 68, at 421. 
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to perform an exacting textual analysis, and might instead prefer an analysis of 
the purpose and intent of the law. 
Beyond the mode of interpretation, not all would-be litigants can avail 
themselves of the courts’ judgement. The judiciary poses unique barriers to 
access. The same factors that make the judiciary independent also increase the 
cost of admission.79 Judicial “decisions are anchored in the facts of concrete 
disputes between real people.”80 Unlike legislators, who can choose to resolve 
issues as they see fit, the judiciary must wait for a case to be brought by parties.81 
Even if parties bring a lawsuit, courts face justiciability and jurisdiction 
concerns not imposed on the other branches.82 Standing requirements, in 
particular, close the door on many who might otherwise wish to challenge a 
particular statutory interpretation.83 Parties must have a concrete injury that is 
fairly traceable to the challenged conduct and redressable by the courts.84 
Likewise, parties must comply with complex, often counterintuitive procedural 
rules. The complaining party must put these complaints in writing,85 file the 
complaint,86 and properly serve it to the opposing party.87 Once the complaint is 
filed, parties face a myriad of legal processes and rules.88 Often, hiring a lawyer is 
the least expensive way to comply with the requirements necessary to pursue a 
claim in court.89 In contrast, parties who wish to solicit change from the political 
branches do not face such barriers to entry. 
Once the case is in front of the court, the judicial problem-solving process is 
unique in ways that impact courts’ abilities to interpret statutes. Courts collect 
data through litigants in an adversarial setting.90 Litigants may fail to reference 
the appropriate facts or may fail to give the best arguments sufficient weight.91 
While courts consider policy and values, generally judges are not permitted to 
make blatant policy decisions as a legislature might.92 Rather, courts must 
primarily rely on the law.93 And, in making decisions, courts must attempt to 
 
 79. KOMESAR, supra note 59, at 125. 
 80. POSNER, supra note 73, at 257. 
 81. KOMESAR, supra note 59, at 125. 
 82. RICHARD A. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 101 (7th ed. 2015). 
 83. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (holding that an environmental 
protection organization did not have standing to challenge a Fish and Wildlife Service regulation). 
 84. Id.; see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
 85. FED. R. CIV. P. 8. 
 86. FED. R. CIV. P. 3. 
 87. FED. R. CIV. P. 4; KOMESAR, supra note 59, at 125. 
 88. KOMESAR, supra note 59, at 125. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 141. 
 91. VERMEULE, supra note 22, at 109. 
 92. Young, supra note 57, at 1837. 
 93. Id.  
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create a principled rule that will allow consistent rulings in the future and thus 
protect judicial legitimacy.94 
Finally, the federal judiciary was designed so that judges would be 
independent. The judiciary is significantly smaller than the executive branch, 
both in physical resources and personnel.95 Federal judges are appointed for life 
with a salary that “cannot be diminished.”96 Moreover, “federal judges 
traditionally come to the bench as a final vocation.”97 Judges are not easily 
influenced by “replacement or inducement.”98 Unlike actors in the political 
branches, judges can only be replaced through death, retirement, or a difficult 
impeachment process.99 And, unlike legislators, federal judges do not need to 
raise money for reelection.100 Accordingly, federal judges have a unique level of 
independence. Because of their independence, federal judges are—in theory—
less prone to influence from special interest groups than the political branches. 
Despite these structural protections, there is great debate about whether the 
judiciary is independent in practice.101 This criticism is particularly prevalent in 
the issue of judge and justice selection.102 While important, these concerns are 
beyond the scope of this Note. What is critical here is that the guarantees of 
lifetime employment and a set salary allow for some level of judicial 
independence in that judges are unconcerned with reelection. 
This level of independence may have consequences in statutory 
interpretation. Political officials “must understand the wants and needs of the 
general public.”103 Judges, in contrast, “stand aloof.”104 This aloofness may impact 
the judges’ understanding of legislation.105 Judges “are often remote from 
people.”106 Their long careers may indicate their understanding of societal values 
 
 94. Id.; see also, Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. 
L.REV. 1, 15 (1959). 
 95. The executive branch employs 2.6 million civilians, while the judiciary employees approximately 
30,000. JULIE JENNINGS & JARED C. NAGEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43590, FEDERAL 
WORKFORCE STATISTICS SOURCES: OPM AND OMB 6 (2018). See also KOMESAR, supra note 59, at 123. 
 96. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 97. KOMESAR, supra note 59, at 124. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See, e.g., Garrett Epps, A Failure of Judicial Independence, THE ATLANTIC, June 26, 2018, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/06/a-failure-of-judicial-independence/563789/ 
[https://perma.cc/MD44-AKWU] (discussing the Supreme Court’s upholding of the “travel ban”) ; Adam 
Liptak, Chief Justice Defends Judicial Independence After Trump Attacks ‘Obama Judge’, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 21, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/21/us/politics/trump-chief-justice-roberts-rebuke.html 
[https://perma.cc/BJX9-DYX9] (discussing the dueling statements between President Trump and Chief 
Justice Roberts about the independence of the judiciary). 
 102. Liptak, supra note 101. 
 103. KOMESAR, supra note 59, at 141. 
 104. Id. 
 105. VERMEULE, supra note 22, at 64. 
 106. Id. at 47. 
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stems from a “bygone era.”107 Judges may misunderstand the majority view.108 Or, 
federal judges may act in a way that is counter-majoritarian, because they do not 
feel the pressures of public accountability.109 
B. The Legislature 
In contrast to the judiciary, Congress is intimately tied to the citizens. It is 
easier for citizens to access the legislature, and for Congress to gather information 
about the will of the citizens. Congressional action, however, is not without 
procedural roadblocks. And, because of its connection to the people, Congress 
might be more willing to favor special-interest groups. 
Congress is often characterized as more in-tune with the population than with 
the judiciary.110 Congressional members are elected and, unlike federal judges 
and most other civil servants, serve fixed terms.111 Therefore, legislators “must 
understand the wants and needs of the general public” to remain popular enough 
to be reelected.112 This connection to the public provides legislators with the 
necessary information to make public policy decisions, including deciding how to 
weigh different policy opinions.113 Congress, then, is defined by the 
responsiveness of its members to the public.114 Because congresspersons are 
elected by state or local populations, Congress represents the diverse needs of 
the country.115 
And it is easier for citizens to participate in the legislative process than to 
participate in the judicial process. The political process is, in one sense, open to 
anyone who is willing to voice their problems.116 Legislators’ decision making is 
not constrained to individual cases.117 Nor does Congress have to wait for private 
parties with standing to bring a claim related to the problem.118 In some cases, 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. James M. Fisher, Institutional Competency: Some Reflections on Judicial Activism in the Realm 
of Forum Allocation Between State and Federal Courts, 34 U. MIAMI L.REV. 175, 194 (1980). Note that 
not all critics agree that judicial action is necessarily counter-majoritarian. See, e.g., Hans Linde, Judges, 
Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 248 (1972) (arguing that the “agonizing” over the 
counter-majoritarian problem in federal courts is the result of an unduly narrow view of the constitutional 
system; the sorts of decisions complained about as undemocratic in federal courts are routinely made in 
state courts without similar concern). 
 110. But this is, again, contested. See, e.g., Ron Elving, Both Parties Claim Public Support in Shutdown 
Struggle. Who’s Out of Touch? NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, Jan. 22, 2018, 
https://www.npr.org/2018/01/22/579397310/shutdown-question-who-s-out-of-touch-with-the-american-
people [https://perma.cc/7GS4-GHMK].  
 111. U.S. CONST. art. I. 
 112. KOMESAR, supra note 59, at 141. 
 113. Id. 
 114. James O. Freedman, Review: Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence, 43 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 307, 325 (1976). 
 115. Id. 
 116. KOMESAR, supra note 59, at 127. 
 117. Id. at 125. 
 118. Id. 
193 - BOOK PROOF - SOWERS (DO NOT DELETE) 8/14/2019  10:10 AM 
No. 3 2019] LAW-DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 207 
Congress will act without any voter involvement at all, on the mere belief that 
voters are interested.119 Likewise, Congress can take the initiative—through 
pollsters, for example—to gather information, rather than waiting for the 
information to come to them.120 
While access to Congress is relatively easy,121 Congress has its own procedural 
roadblocks to action. Legislative acts are subject to bicameralism and 
presentment.122 Congress likewise must comply with procedural requirements 
and prioritize items on a limited agenda.123 Not to mention the abundant, current 
political gridlock that forecloses most major legislative action.124 
Moreover, while Congress has an incentive to appreciate the needs of the 
public, legislators may not need to understand the needs of the entire general 
public.125 Rather, legislators may only need to listen to the most powerful voices 
of the public.126 Congress may favor special-interest groups,127 or may be more 
prone to bias than the judiciary.128 And the interests that Congress is most likely 
to serve are not necessarily those that protect the majority of the citizenry.129 
“Widely-distributed benefits,” such as Section 1983 protections or broad worker 
protections, are less likely to inspire special-interest groups.130 Each potential 
beneficiary—according to political markets theorists—is less likely to invest time 
advocating for the change because she has only a small stake in the overall 
benefit.131 Thus, these “distributed benefit” laws are less likely to be enacted 
because they do not enjoy the support of public-interest groups.132 
Finally, in part because of the need for reelection and in part because of the 
difficulty of creating new legislation, Congress may be tempted to delegate 
 
 119. Id. at 127. 
 120. Id. 
 121. This institutional analysis is comparative. Thus, access to Congress is relatively easy, in the sense 
that citizens can make their voice heard through voting, or contacting their representatives, much more 
easily than they can litigate a case. This is not meant to say that underrepresented or marginalized groups 
do not face systemic hurdles to participating in the political process at all. See, e.g., Daniel Weeks, Why 
Are the Poor and Minorities Less Likely to Vote?, THE ATLANTIC, JAN 10, 2014, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/01/why-are-the-poor-and-minorities-less-likely-to-
vote/282896/ [https://perma.cc/4RXN-UXW8] (“Taken together, the surveys suggest that white citizens 
who abstain from voting do so primarily by choice, while the majority of minority non-voters face 
problems along the way.”). 
 122. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983). 
 123. Eskridge, supra note 77, at 1531. 
 124. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Nicholas Fandos, As Gridlock Deepens in Congress, Only Gloom Is 
Bipartisan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/27/us/politics/congress-
dysfunction-conspiracies-trump.html [https://perma.cc/HUW3-2FCQ].  
 125. See, KOMESAR, supra note 59, at 141. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Eskridge, supra note 77, at 1530. 
 128. See KOMESAR, supra note 59, at 141. 
 129. Eskridge, supra note 77, at 1518. 
 130. .See id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 1530. 
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difficult or unpopular decisions.133 Congress is now largely decentralized, 
operating through “subgovernments” such as committees and agencies.134 In fact, 
Congress now delegates the overwhelming majority of law making to agencies.135 
C. Agencies 
Agencies are the nimblest of the three institutions. Agencies are made up of 
specialists.  They may not be as versed in formal statutory interpretation as the 
judiciary, but agencies can communicate directly with Congress. Federal agencies 
also lack the formal constitutional constraints of the legislature and judiciary and 
can therefore act quickly. 
Unlike the judiciary and legislative branches, whose broad jurisdictional 
mandates require generalists, each agency is made up of specialists focused on 
one set of problems.136 Thus, agencies likely have more technical knowledge in 
the underlying regulated conduct.137 This technical knowledge, and the fact that 
agencies think about these problems more than courts because they deal with 
them every day, might lead to better decision making—particularly in a purposive 
context, where the agency must determine specific applications of laws.138 
Not only are agencies more specialized, but they often communicate directly 
with legislators.139 For instance, legislators will communicate when the agencies’ 
interpretations are off base.140 Recognition of this communication has impacted 
scholars’ understanding of agency accountability:141 while most scholars once 
wrote off agencies as unaccountable because they lacked an “electoral 
connection,”142 a growing assembly now perceives agencies as accountable to 
both Congress and the President.143 However, agencies are not only influenced 
by the political branches of government, they are also influenced by special 
interest groups and the media.144 
 
 133. Id. at 1532. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Young, supra note 57, at 1792. Of course, Congress does not delegate only, or even primarily, to 
avoid making unpopular decisions. Rather, to meet the increasing demands for a more active 
government, Congress needs to avoid the unwieldly requirements of bicameralism and presentment. One 
way to accomplish this is through the administrative process. Id. 
 136. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 54, at 928. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Eskridge, supra note 68, at 421. 
 139. Id. at 425. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Bradley Lipton, Accountability, Deference, and the Skidmore Doctrine, 119 YALE L.J. 2096 
(2010). 
 142. Id. at 2102. 
 143. Id. at 2105; Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability and Political Review of Agency 
Rules, 51 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1059 (2001) (describing the new ways in which Congress has held agencies 
accountable including, through Congressional committee, through Office of Management and Budget 
review, and through Congressional fast-track review). 
 144. Lipton, supra note 141, at 2105. 
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Another comparative institutional strength of agencies is their capacity to 
plan both big picture and finite rules, and to do so relatively quickly. Unlike 
courts, agencies are not required to tackle problems on a case-by-case basis.145 
Rather, agencies can consider the legislative scheme and purpose.146 While 
agencies can develop big picture rules, they also have the bandwidth and 
expertise to provide detailed rules.147 Agencies cannot, however, perform an 
entirely holistic review. Where problems cross multiple regulatory agencies (i.e., 
a new technology impacts both environmental and consumer protections), 
agencies are limited to their subject areas. Thus, the specialization of agencies 
could lead to conflicting analyses and interpretations. 
Finally, agencies can act more quickly to develop final, nation-wide rules than 
legislatures or courts. An agency does not have to wait for a case with standing 
to be appealed to the Supreme Court to make a final decision. Nor does an 
agency have to deal with the rigors of bicameralism and presentment. Rather, 
agencies must comply with the notice and comment requirements of the 
Administrative Procedure Act.148 Once the rule is promulgated, agencies 
disseminate the rules quickly, through published guidance and websites.149 
IV. 
PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE AND LAW-DISRUPTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY 
These general principles of institutional competence can be applied to the 
problems of law-disruptive technology to determine which branch is best suited 
to provide statutory interpretation. This comparison must be done considering 
the goals established above: the ideal institutions for considering law-disruptive 
technology should be democratically accountable and should quickly provide 
predictable rules. Here, gig economy worker classification is useful to illustrate 
the strengths and weaknesses of each branch in meeting these goals. 
A. Institutional Choice Applied: Democratic Accountability 
Congress and the administrative agencies are much more in tune with the will 
of the people than the courts. Legislators must stay informed of the wants of their 
constituents in order to be re-elected.150 Likewise, legislators have the tools to 
collect the data necessary to consider the problem—and constituents’ opinions—
 
 145. Eskridge, supra note 68, at 419. 
 146. Id. Agencies may be particularly familiar with individual statutes, including their enactment and 
legislative history. VERMEULE, supra note 22, at 115. Agencies thus do not have to confront a particular 
legislative history in each new case; they see the same sources over and over again. Id. 
 147. Eskridge, supra note 68, at 419. 
 148. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (requiring at least thirty days’ notice). 
 149. Eskridge, supra note 68, at 419. 
 150. KOMESAR, supra note 59, at 141. 
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holistically.151 Courts, in contrast, “stand aloof.”152 Judges are appointed not 
elected.153 Judges serve lifetime appointments.154 And they have set salaries.155 
Therefore, judges have much less of an incentive to pay attention to the will of 
the electorate than congresspersons. 
Agencies form somewhat of a middle ground. While agencies are not directly 
accountable to the people, agencies are increasingly held accountable by 
Congress and the President.156 And unpopular agency decisions are often 
discussed in the press with blame shifting back, ultimately, to the President.157 
Thus, while those running agencies are not elected, they face pressure from the 
executive branch to know what the electorate wants. Because agencies are made 
up of specialists,158 they may have an easier time determining the electoral will, 
as they can focus on one area of policy, rather than weighing the relative strengths 
of competing interests.159 
The importance of democratic accountability plays out clearly in the gig 
economy worker classification context. For instance, there could be a societal 
consensus that gig economy workers should retain (at least some) protections 
generally only given to employees. But judges have far less incentive to know 
about such a societal consensus than congresspersons or agency bureaucrats. 
Alternatively, there could be a consensus among gig economy workers that 
they prefer to maintain the level of flexibility that being a contractor provides in 
exchange for a reduction in benefits. In the political process, these workers could 
band together to lobby for the ability to continue as independent contractors. 
The judiciary, however, does not allow for such lobbying. Rather, the judiciary 
can only consider the facts of the case before it, not the preferences of the 
affected population at large. 
This connection to the electorate is critical in the realm of law-disruptive 
technology. Law-disruptive technology involves new, never-before-considered 
problems of statutory interpretation. It makes sense for one of the politically 
accountable branches to consider how the technology fits into current statutes. 
Therefore, in terms of democratic accountability, Congress is the institution best 
situated to handle statutory interpretation in the face of law-disruptive 
technology. Agencies emerge as a second-best alternative. 
 
 151. Id. at 127. 
 152. Id. at 141. 
 153. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 154. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Lipton, supra note 141, at 2105. 
 157. See, e.g., Devon Hall, New EPA Rule Would Force People to Choose Between Privacy and Health, 
CNN, July 31, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/31/opinions/epa-regulation-threatens-privacy-health-
hall/index.html [https://perma.cc/ZXS9-UP8M] (criticizing a rule requiring the EPA to only consider 
reports that provide their information to the public). 
 158. Eskridge, supra note 53, at 928. 
 159. As opposed to the executive, who not only has to determine the prevailing sentiment on how 
labor laws should apply to the gig economy, but also has to determine whether people care about it more 
or less than other completely unrelated problems, such as the need to increase infrastructure. 
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B. Institutional Choice Applied: Predictability and Efficacy 
The courts are also the least predictable and effective branch for dealing with 
law-disruptive technology. Rather than tackling the problem as a whole, courts 
must consider the decision in the framework of a dispute between two parties.160 
Courts must rely on the parties to frame the factual and legal issues in such a way 
that the problem can be appropriately solved.161 Thus, solutions to broad legal 
problems are doled out in case-sized bites. These cases are not necessarily 
integrated and can cause unpredictable or nonsensical results when viewed in 
aggregate. 
Gig economy worker classification, for instance, is not a single statutory 
problem to be solved. Rather, there are different definitions of employee and 
independent contractor depending on which federal law is being applied.162 For 
example, questions of minimum wage and salary protections under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act use the economic realities test.163 But determining whether 
a worker is an employee for union organizing purposes uses the Internal Revenue 
Service common law test.164 Thus, a court would have to wait for each type of 
claim to come before it, and decide based on the facts of the case and the 
appropriate test whether the worker was an employee. This may result in 
multiple, potentially conflicting, classifications that apply to gig economy 
workers. 
Moreover, cases are not always clean. Judges may have to wade through bad 
or difficult facts.165 Because the problems would be taken up by different courts 
in different states considering different questions, courts would likely come up 
with conflicting and unclear rules. Thus, it is difficult for courts to create a 
cohesive scheme. While this is a feature of a federalist system of government, it 
would have a particularly detrimental impact on law-disruptive technology. 
People, companies, and the government need predictable rules for technology 
that has such massive impacts. And courts are not able to provide them. To have 
a truly cohesive judicial scheme, the case must make it through the full appellate 
process to the Supreme Court. Nor can courts provide answers quickly. They 
must wait for the complaint to come to them.166 
Congress, in contrast, is situated to set the most comprehensive rules. 
Congress does not have to focus narrowly on the case brought before it.167 Rather, 
it is free to wield its legislative powers without prompting.168 Moreover, given the 
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development of the commerce clause, Congress can reach a vast array of 
activities.169 Most importantly, unlike the other branches, Congress can change 
existing legislation or create new legislation. Thus—if the law-disruptive 
technology does not fit into the existing legal structures—Congress can enact new 
legislation to better address the issues that the new or improved technology 
presents. In this sense Congress is uniquely situated to handle law-disruptive 
technology. However, while Congress can legislative holistically, it is not well 
situated to move quickly—particularly not in the political climate of 2019 and the 
foreseeable future. Bicameralism takes time. Each house must review, debate, 
and amend the bills. Political pressures can cause delays, particularly in politically 
sensitive legislation. 
Congress could, in theory, be the branch best suited to solve a problem like 
gig economy worker classification. It could simply legislate those rights that gig 
economy workers are entitled to. Moreover, Congress could act all at once 
without waiting for a case framing the precise problem, or for all the necessary 
agencies to solve their specified issue. This would provide the predictability 
necessary. But gig economy worker classification is a hot-button issue. There is a 
lot of money at stake for the companies and unions, and workers have strong 
opinions on how they should be classified. It is unlikely with the present gridlock 
that Congress could realistically act quickly to put together a comprehensive 
worker classification arrangement. 
Agencies—again—form a middle ground. While agencies cannot create 
entirely new, comprehensive legislation, they can promulgate new regulations. 
Agencies have the tools and expertise to create broad and consistent rules within 
their assigned areas of delegation.170 Agencies, however, present only a partial 
solution in the context of law-disruptive technology because they are so 
specialized: multiple agencies may be responsible for a different piece of a single 
issue. Finally, agencies are the most adept of the three institutions at moving 
quickly. Agencies do not have to wait for a case to be brought to them, nor do 
they have to meet the requirements of bicameralism and presentment. 
In the context of gig economy worker classification, the advantages and 
disadvantages of agency interpretation are evident. Unlike courts or Congress, 
agencies could quickly indicate how gig economy workers fit into various 
employment law schemes. Agencies could provide predictability for companies 
as they attempt to grow, and workers as they attempt to assert their rights. Yet 
agencies are not a perfect solution.  As mentioned above, the definition of 
employees spans the purview of several agencies: the DOL, the IRS, and OFCCP 
to name a few. The rules would not necessarily be consistent across the alphabet 
soup of relevant agencies. The National Labor Relations Board would be tasked 
with determining how gig economy workers fit into the National Labor Relations 
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Act.171 The Department of Labor would determine the relevant overtime rules.172 
The Internal Revenue Service would have to determine how the workers would 
be taxed.173 
Therefore, Congress appears—based on an institutional competence 
analysis—best-suited for providing predictability. But Congress also seems 
unlikely to act quickly, because of bipartisanism or another such impediment, so 
agencies provide a second-best solution. While agencies still must consider law-
disruptive technology problems piecemeal (based on their assigned areas of 
specialty), they can consider the problems more broadly and quickly than courts. 
If the goals of statutory interpretation of laws relating to law-disruptive 
technology are to have a democratically accountable institution consider the 
problems quickly and provide predictability, the political branches are best suited 
to provide statutory interpretation. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on an analysis of comparative institutional competency, Congress is 
best-suited to interpret statutes in light of law-disruptive technology. Agencies 
provide a second-best option. 
But this proposed conclusion leaves at least one major practical problem. 
Federal courts must consider the case in front of them.174 They cannot simply 
refuse to hear a case. Of course, Congress could choose to act quickly, before 
suits about law-disruptive technology become common. But, given the current 
political atmosphere and Congressional gridlock, this seems unlikely. 
One solution is for the U.S. Supreme Court to deny certiorari on questions 
involving law-disruptive technology. In one sense, this goes against the goals of 
statutory interpretation for law-disruptive technology. It slows down the process 
and likely leaves inconsistent rules at the Circuit Court level. However, Congress 
might be more likely to act in the face of uncertainty and unsettled law.175 
The better course of action might be to have lower courts give increased 
deference to agencies in cases involving law-disruptive technology.176 Some of the 
benefits will be realized, namely quick decisions, consistent rules (at least within 
agencies), and some democratic accountability. And, because Congress often 
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communicates with agencies, Congress will likely hear about the interpretive and 
shoehorning problems and may be more incentivized to act. 
Law-disruptive technology is already changing the world. As issues involving 
law-disruptive technology work their way through the legal system, courts will 
have a choice: wield their shoehorns and attempt to force law-disruptive 
technology into existing statutory frameworks, or yield their shoehorns and defer 
to the other branches’ interpretations. Based on a comparative analysis of 
institutional competence, yielding will provide the better outcome. 
 
